Norms like paying taxes or wearing a seatbelt are binding due to the nature of institutional facts, which require human agreement. Natural lawyers argue that these obligations stem from moral standards, while legal positivists suggest that social facts like laws and customs create them. However, critics argue that positivists fall into Hume's is-ought fallacy by deriving normative claims from descriptive statements. It is suggested that legal obligations must derive from institutional rather than brute social facts, thereby challenging the validity of pure positivism in legal theory.
Legal obligations cannot simply arise from brute social facts, as seen in the analogy of a bully forcing someone to surrender their lunch money. Coercion alone does not create moral responsibilities.
Searle's distinction between brute facts and institutional facts clarifies that while brute facts exist independently, institutional facts, such as legal obligations, rely on human agreement to exist and function.
Collection
[
|
...
]